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(Filed:  May 25, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
___________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
 David Cobb and Jonathan Cobb challenge their respective convictions related to 
their participation in a cocaine distribution scheme, alleging that the District Court erred 
by admitting conversations captured on an illegal wiretap, failing to exclude evidence 
seized during the warrantless search of David Cobb’s vehicle, and allowing inappropriate 
expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  David Cobb also challenges the 
District Court’s admission of his prior convictions, and Jonathan Cobb contends that the 
District Court’s upward variance at his sentencing renders his sentence unreasonable.  
We will affirm in all respects. 
. 
I.   
  Because we write exclusively for the parties, we provide only an abbreviated 
summary of the facts essential to our disposition.  On November 18, 2009, a grand jury 
returned a two-count indictment charging brothers David and Jonathan Cobb with 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(B)(ii).  These charges arose from the Cobbs’ participation as middlemen in a 
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cocaine distribution enterprise in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, which law 
enforcement authorities began investigating in March 2008.   
As part of its investigation, authorities sought to obtain a wiretap for Jonathan 
Cobb’s mobile phone pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518.  In support of its application for a 
wiretap, the Government submitted a 64-page affidavit from FBI Special Agent Luke 
Church detailing the nature and scope of the investigation of the Cobbs’ drug dealing 
activities.  Appendix (“App.”) 54-117.1  The necessity section of this affidavit, which 
spanned eight pages, stated that “interception of wire communications over [Jonathan 
Cobb’s mobile phone] is the only available technique with a reasonable likelihood of 
identifying the full scope of this conspiracy” given the insular nature of the enterprise and 
the Cobbs’ efforts to evade police surveillance.  Id. at 106-14.  In support of this 
assertion, Agent Church explained that the use of undercover agents and additional 
confidential informants was dangerous and unlikely to lead to additional relevant 
information, given that the Cobbs “are very cautious and normally deal only with persons 
who have had a close relationship with one or more members of the organization” and 
none of the confidential informants were in a position to provide information about the 
Cobbs’ suppliers.  Id. at 108-09.  Agent Church further averred that physical surveillance 
had been difficult because Jonathan Cobb actively sought to avoid detection, including 
using rental cars and monitoring the cars outside his home.  Id.
                                              
1  Jonathan and David Cobb filed separate appendices containing the same relevant 
documents.  For convenience, all citations to the “Appendix” refer to the appendix filed 
by Jonathan Cobb.  
 at 110-11.  Other forms of 
investigation were likewise problematic because they would make the Cobbs aware of the 
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ongoing investigation and thus cause the Cobbs to “become more circumspect in their 
dealings.”  Id.
Based on the information contained in Agent Church’s affidavit, on September 29, 
2009, the District Court authorized a 30-day wiretap of Jonathan Cobb’s mobile phone.  
The evidence obtained through the wiretap included conversations in which Jonathan 
Cobb orchestrated the buying and selling of cocaine and warned his co-conspirators about 
police surveillance.  On October 20, 2009, agents overheard a conversation that led them 
to believe Jonathan and David Cobb were planning to obtain a large quantity of cocaine 
that evening.  
 at 113. 
Id. at 146.  Based on surveillance indicating the Cobbs had met with their 
supplier, police stopped each of their respective cars on an exit ramp off an interstate.  Id. 
at 194-223.  After an officer ordered David Cobb to put his hands up, the officer observed 
David Cobb lean down with both hands “down below the seat area” of the car.  Id. at 224.  
David Cobb eventually complied, and the same police officer drove David Cobb’s 
vehicle to a nearby parking lot.  Id. at 224-25.  While driving, the officer noticed a 
shopping bag under the passenger seat, which he later discovered contained a 997-gram 
brick of cocaine.  Id.
Both sides filed pretrial motions.  The Government sought to introduce recordings 
obtained during the wiretap of Jonathan Cobb’s mobile phone and evidence of prior 
criminal conduct pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and 609.  The Cobbs 
opposed these motions (either by argument or by brief) and filed a motion to suppress 
evidence seized from the warrantless search of David Cobb’s vehicle.  On June 15, 2010, 
 at 225.   
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the District Court granted the motion to admit wiretap evidence and partially granted the 
Government’s motion to admit evidence under Rule 404(b).   
Following a seven-day trial, on June 28, 2010, a jury found Jonathan and David 
Cobb guilty of both counts.2
II. 
  On November 3, 2010, David Cobb was sentenced to a term 
of 288 months of imprisonment, eight years of supervised release, and a $1,500 fine.  
Two days later, Jonathan Cobb was sentenced to an identical period of imprisonment and 
supervised release, along with a $2,500 fine.   
A. 
The Cobbs first contend that the wiretap of Jonathan Cobb’s phone was improper 
because Agent Church’s affidavit failed to demonstrate the required necessity to secure a 
wiretap.  “We review de novo the question of whether a full and complete statement of 
necessity for a wiretap was made in the application.  Once it is determined that the 
statement was made, we will review the court’s determination of necessity for an abuse 
of discretion.”  United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 1189 (3d Cir. 1992).3
To demonstrate necessity, the Government must provide an affidavit containing “a 
full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been 
tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be 
  
                                              
2  A third co-defendant was found not guilty on both counts. 
3  Because David Cobb did not join Jonathan Cobb’s pretrial motion to bar wiretap 
evidence, the Government asserts that we should apply plain error review.  Gov’t Br. 36 
n.4.  David Cobb responds that he did join in the objection at trial.  Because we hold that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the wiretap evidence, we need 
not decide whether David Cobb properly raised an objection to this evidence. 
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too dangerous[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).  After evaluating this affidavit, a court may 
only grant an application for a wiretap if it finds that “normal investigative procedures” 
have failed, or such procedures are too dangerous or are unlikely to succeed.  Id. § 
2518(3)(c).  These necessity provisions were “designed to assure that wiretapping is not 
resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to 
expose the crime.”  United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12  (1974).  However, 
“courts have consistently held that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) does not require the 
government to exhaust all other investigative procedures before resorting to electronic 
surveillance.”  United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 418 (3d Cir. 1997).   Rather, the 
“government need only lay a ‘factual predicate’ sufficient to inform the judge why other 
methods of investigation are not sufficient.”  Id. (quoting United States v. McGlory
Review of the affidavit submitted by Agent Church compels us to conclude that 
the wiretap application contained sufficient factual information to demonstrate why other 
methods of investigation were inadequate.  Specifically, Agent Church explained that the 
drug dealing conspiracy took great care to conceal its activities, especially insofar as 
members of the conspiracy refused to engage in transactions with unknown persons and 
took affirmative steps to thwart police surveillance.  App. 108-13.  Thus, we find that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the wiretap was warranted.
, 968 
F.2d 309, 345 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
4
                                              
4  David Cobb also argues that the wiretap was improper because Agent Church’s 
affidavit did not establish probable cause that “particular communications concerning” a 
narcotics-related offense would be captured through a wiretap, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(3).  There is extensive evidence in the affidavit that Jonathan Cobb used his mobile 
 
7 
 
B. 
 The Cobbs next argue that the District Court erred by failing to suppress evidence 
of the cocaine found in the automobile driven by David Cobb.  “[W]e review the denial 
of a suppression motion for clear error as to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary 
review as to its legality in light of the court’s properly found facts.”  United States v. 
Agnew
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant 
before conducting a search, the longstanding “automobile exception” to the warrant 
requirement allows police to search a vehicle so long as there is “probable cause to 
believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.”  
, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332, 347 (2009).  Thus, when there is probable cause to search a vehicle, the search “is 
not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even 
though a warrant has not been actually obtained.”  United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 
809 (1982).  This type of automobile search may extend to “any area of the vehicle in 
which the evidence might be found.”  Gant
Accordingly, if the police had probable cause to believe drugs or other evidence of 
the Cobbs’ drug dealing conspiracy was present in the vehicle, the search of the vehicle 
cannot violate the Fourth Amendment.  Probable cause is a “fluid concept” that requires a 
court to analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine whether “there is a fair 
, 556 U.S. at 347. 
                                                                                                                                                  
phone to conduct illegal drug transactions, including a statement from a confidential 
witness that Jonathan Cobb used his mobile phone for this purpose.  See App. 72-73.  
This argument is plainly without merit. 
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probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  
Illinois v. Gates
We have no difficultly concluding that the District Court was correct in finding 
that police officers had probable cause to believe that evidence of the Cobbs’ drug 
dealing operation was present in the vehicle.  By this point, federal and state investigators 
had collected ample evidence that the Cobbs bought and sold illegal narcotics.  The 
wiretapped conversation between Jonathan Cobb and his supplier led investigators to 
believe that the Cobbs intended to meet with the supplier to obtain a large amount of 
cocaine.  Law enforcement officers then arranged surveillance, through which they 
observed the Cobbs meet with the supplier and then drive away.  Although the 
surveillance team briefly lost track of the Cobbs’ vehicles during this transaction, they 
were able to locate them by tracing their cell phones shortly after they believed the 
transaction occurred.  The totality of the evidence here compels us to uphold the District 
Court’s finding that there was probable cause to search David Cobb’s vehicle, and thus 
the District Court did not err by refusing to suppress the evidence found pursuant to that 
search. 
, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
C. 
 Jonathan Cobb next argues that the District Court erred in allowing Police Officer 
David Tyler to testify as an expert in the field of coded drug language.  We review the 
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admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 
188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999).5
 District courts have broad discretion to determine whether to admit expert 
testimony so long as such testimony “is helpful to the trier of fact.”  
 
Id.  More relevant to 
the specific circumstances here, “it is well established that experienced government 
agents may testify to the meaning of coded drug language under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.”  Id.  We have explained that “[b]ecause the primary purpose of coded 
drug language is to conceal the meaning of the conversation from outsiders through 
deliberate obscurity, drug traffickers’ jargon is a specialized body of knowledge and thus 
an appropriate subject for expert testimony.”  
 Officer Tyler testified that he had been an officer in the Chester County Police 
Department for twenty-one years, sixteen of which were spent in the narcotics unit.  App. 
320.  During his career, Officer Tyler participated in more than 1,000 drug investigations 
and received specialized training on the coded language used by drug dealers.  
Id. 
Id.
                                              
5  Although the Government suggests that we should review this claim for plain error 
because the Cobbs did not properly object at trial, the record reveals that counsel for both 
David and Jonathan Cobb objected to Officer Tyler testifying as an expert witness.  App. 
311. 
 at 299, 
314.  Given his lengthy experience with confidential informants and narcotics dealers, 
Officer Tyler was well-qualified to opine on the meaning of the language used by these 
defendants.  Moreover, while Jonathan Cobb argues that Officer Tyler’s testimony was 
unhelpful to the jury because he “simply narrate[d] what is being said among the 
conversant on the intercepted calls,” J. Cobb Br. 29, the copious use of slang and jargon 
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by the Cobbs during the wiretapped conversations made Officer Tyler’s testimony useful 
because it enabled the jury to understand what the conversations were about.  We also see 
no error in the District Court’s decision to allow Officer Tyler to serve as both an expert 
witness and a fact witness, given that his testimony as a fact witness was limited to 
identifying the voices heard during the wiretapped conversations.  The District Court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting Officer Tyler’s testimony. 
D. 
 David Cobb also argues that the District Court erred by allowing the Government 
to introduce his prior drug convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  Our 
review is plenary when a district court’s ruling “requires us to interpret the rules of 
evidence.”  United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2006).   However, we 
review a district court’s decision to admit evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) 
for an abuse of discretion so long as “the evidence could have been admissible in some 
circumstances.”  
 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the introduction of “[e]vidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts” for the purpose of “prov[ing] the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith.”  Such evidence may be admitted, however, “for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,” so long as “the prosecution in a 
criminal case [provides] reasonable notice in advance of trial . . . of the general nature of 
any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.”  
Id. 
Id.   Thus, we have held that evidence 
of other acts may be admitted under Rule 404(b) when it (1) has a proper evidentiary 
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purpose, (2) is relevant under Rule 402, (3) is not substantially more prejudicial than 
probative as required by Rule 403, and (4) is accompanied by a limiting instruction, when 
such an instruction is requested.  United States v. Cross
Under these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the admission of David Cobb’s two former convictions for possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine satisfied Rule 404(b).  This evidence was relevant for the 
purpose of showing David Cobb’s knowledge and intent with regard to the brick of 
cocaine discovered in the car he was driving.  As we have held in nearly identical 
circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the evidence 
was not substantially more prejudicial than probative, particularly given that the District 
Court provided an appropriate limiting instruction.  
, 308 F.3d 308, 321 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
See United States v. Givan
David Cobb argues that, unlike the defendant in 
, 320 F.3d 
452, 461-62 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a defendant’s prior drug conviction was properly 
admitted under Rule 404(b) because it was relevant to showing the defendant’s intent 
with regard to the drugs found in his car and the court had issued a proper limiting 
instruction).  Thus, the Rule 404(b) elements are satisfied. 
United States v. Givan, he did not 
put his knowledge at issue because he did not testify in his own defense to deny knowing 
the drugs were in his car.  This contention is unavailing because we have held that “[t]he 
parameters of Rule 404(b) are not set by the defense’s theory of the case; they are set by 
the material issues and facts the government must prove to obtain a conviction.”  United 
States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir. 1992).  Because intent was a necessary 
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element of the charges for which David Cobb was on trial, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence. 
E. 
Finally, Jonathan Cobb argues that the District Court erred by granting the 
Government’s motion for an upward variance to give him a sentence significantly higher 
than the range recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  Review of a 
sentence imposed by a district court requires us to consider first whether the district court 
committed any procedural error.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).  If no such error occurred, we must then consider the sentence’s 
substantive reasonableness based on the totality of the circumstances.  Id.  “At both 
stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of demonstrating 
unreasonableness.”  
Jonathan Cobb alleges no procedural error, but instead argues that his sentence of 
288 months of imprisonment, well above the recommended Guidelines range of 130-162 
months, was unreasonable in light of the factors already encompassed in the Guidelines 
calculation and his “relatively modest criminal record.”  J. Cobb Br. 32.  Given the 
extensive criminal background described in Jonathan Cobb’s Pre-Sentence Investigation 
Report, which included crimes involving guns and violence, and given the evidence 
showing Jonathan Cobb was the leader of the conspiracy in this case, he has not satisfied 
his burden of proving that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. 
Id. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments of the District Court.   
